Line-by-Line Security Analysis
Comprehensive security documentation of FlashBankRevolutionary.sol smart contract
Important Disclaimer
This contract has not been externally audited by a professional security firm. While we have implemented extensive security measures and testing, use at your own risk.
We encourage independent security researchers to review the code and report any vulnerabilities.
Security Features Overview
Immutable Design
Contract cannot be upgraded or modified after deployment. What you see is what you get, forever.
Reentrancy Protection
Uses OpenZeppelin's ReentrancyGuard to prevent reentrancy attacks on all critical functions.
Hardcoded Limits
Maximum fee rate (10%) and max flash loan amount (10,000 ETH) are immutable constants.
Transparent Operations
All functions emit events for full transparency. All state changes are auditable on-chain.
Line-by-Line Contract Analysis
Lines 1-7: Imports & Dependencies
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT pragma solidity ^0.8.19; import "@openzeppelin/contracts/access/Ownable.sol"; import "@openzeppelin/contracts/security/ReentrancyGuard.sol"; import "@openzeppelin/contracts/security/Pausable.sol"; import "./IL2FlashLoan.sol";
Lines 27-51: Immutable Security Constants
bool public constant IS_UPGRADEABLE = false; uint256 public constant FLASH_LOAN_FEE_RATE = 2; uint256 public constant MAX_FEE_RATE = 1000; uint256 public constant ABSOLUTE_MAX_FLASH_LOAN = 10000 ether; uint256 public immutable DEPLOYED_AT; uint256 public immutable CREATION_BLOCK;
Lines 248-301: Flash Loan Execution (Critical Function)
function flashLoan(uint256 amount, bytes calldata data)
external nonReentrant whenNotPaused {
if (amount < 0.01 ether) revert FlashLoanAmountTooSmall();
if (amount > ABSOLUTE_MAX_FLASH_LOAN) revert ExceedsAbsoluteLimit();
if (amount > totalCommittedLiquidity) revert InsufficientLiquidity();
uint256 fee = (amount * FLASH_LOAN_FEE_RATE) / 10000;
flashLoanInProgress = true;
_executeClosestMatchPulls(amount);
// Send ETH to borrower
(bool sendSuccess, ) = payable(msg.sender).call{value: amount}("");
require(sendSuccess, "Transfer to borrower failed");
// Execute borrower's strategy
bool strategySuccess = IL2FlashLoan(msg.sender).executeFlashLoan(...);
// Verify repayment
bool repaymentSuccess = address(this).balance >= totalFlashLoanPulls + fee;
if (strategySuccess && repaymentSuccess) {
_distributeProfits(profit);
} else {
_returnAllPulledETH();
revert FlashLoanFailed();
}
}Lines 374-391: Profit Distribution (Fair Lottery System)
function _distributeProfits(uint256 profit) internal {
if (profit == 0 || totalFlashLoanPulls == 0) return;
totalProfitPool += profit;
// Distribute proportionally to AMOUNT LENT (lottery system)
for (uint256 i = 0; i < liquidityProviders.length; i++) {
address provider = liquidityProviders[i];
uint256 lentAmount = flashLoanPulls[provider];
if (lentAmount > 0) {
uint256 userShare = (profit * lentAmount) / totalFlashLoanPulls;
userProfitShares[provider] += userShare;
}
}
}Lines 203-240: Withdrawal Functions
function withdrawCommitment(uint256 amount)
external nonReentrant noFlashLoan {
uint256 currentCommitment = userCommitments[msg.sender];
if (currentCommitment == 0) revert();
if (amount == 0 || amount >= currentCommitment) {
amount = currentCommitment;
}
userCommitments[msg.sender] -= amount;
totalCommittedLiquidity -= amount;
}
function withdrawProfits() external nonReentrant {
uint256 profit = userProfitShares[msg.sender];
if (profit == 0) revert NoProfitsToWithdraw();
userProfitShares[msg.sender] = 0;
totalProfitWithdrawn += profit;
(bool success, ) = payable(msg.sender).call{value: profit}("");
require(success, "Transfer failed");
}Attack Vectors & Mitigations
Attack: Reentrancy
Threat: Attacker calls back into contract during execution to drain funds
Mitigation: All critical functions use OpenZeppelin's nonReentrant modifier. Flash loan lock prevents concurrent flash loans. State updates before external calls.
Attack: Front-Running
Threat: Attacker monitors mempool and front-runs profitable flash loan transactions
Mitigation: Not fully preventable at protocol level (blockchain limitation). Users can use private mempools or MEV protection services. Low fees make front-running less profitable.
Attack: Integer Overflow/Underflow
Threat: Arithmetic operations overflow/underflow causing incorrect calculations
Mitigation: Solidity 0.8.19 has built-in overflow/underflow protection. All arithmetic automatically reverts on overflow/underflow.
Attack: Flash Loan Drain
Threat: Single flash loan drains entire pool balance
Mitigation: ABSOLUTE_MAX_FLASH_LOAN hardcoded to 10,000 ETH. No single flash loan can exceed this limit. Prevents contract drain.
Attack: Owner Rug Pull
Threat: Contract owner steals or locks user funds
Mitigation: Owner has NO access to user funds. Can only pause (emergency) and adjust parameters within hardcoded limits. Contract is non-upgradeable - owner cannot change code. Users can always withdraw profits.
Attack: Denial of Service
Threat: Attacker makes contract unusable through gas griefing or spam
Mitigation: Minimum commitment (0.01 ETH) prevents spam. Emergency pause function allows stopping attacks. Gas-optimised loops prevent griefing.
Testing & Verification
Security Tests Passed
- 25 comprehensive security tests
- Reentrancy attack simulations
- Flash loan failure scenarios
- Edge case testing (0 amounts, max values)
- Multi-user profit distribution tests
On-Chain Verification
- Contract verified on Arbiscan
- Source code publicly readable
- Non-upgradeable confirmed
- All transactions transparent
- Event logs for auditability
Known Limitations & Considerations
1. Not Externally Audited
This contract has not been reviewed by a professional security firm. While extensive testing and security measures are in place, undiscovered vulnerabilities may exist.
2. Smart Contract Risk
All smart contracts carry inherent risk. Even audited contracts can have bugs. Use at your own risk and never invest more than you can afford to lose.
3. Gas Cost Considerations
Flash loan execution requires multiple ETH transfers. During high gas periods, this can be expensive. Flash loans with very small amounts may not be profitable.
4. Network Risk
Deployed on Arbitrum L2. Subject to Arbitrum network risks including potential downtime, sequencer issues, or L1/L2 bridge vulnerabilities.
Bug Bounty Programme
We encourage security researchers to review our code and report any vulnerabilities responsibly.
Critical vulnerabilities: Loss of funds, contract drain - Contact immediately
High severity: Profit manipulation, reentrancy issues - High priority
Medium/Low severity: Gas optimisations, logic errors - Reviewed and appreciated
Last updated: October 2025
This analysis is provided for educational purposes. Always do your own research.